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RESPONSE

Premerger Review and Bankruptcy:
The Meaning of Section 363(b)(2)
by Robert B. Grtenbaum and A./Qn }. !tlee.\·e

ection 363(h)(2) of the Bimkruptcy
Code al!ers the practice under the
llart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust lmpmvements Act OISR Act) when a party
acqu1rcs assets of a hankrupl estate Section .l63(h)(2) pmvidcs that "nutwith·
standing subsection (b) nf lthe IISR
Aclj. the required waiting period" shilll
last ten days ;;fter nutificatiun of the government "unless the cuurt. ilfler notice
and hearing, orders otherwise." II
li.S.C. § 36.\(b)(2)(B). James Spc;m•.
FTC General Counsel, has ilrgued in thi~
magatine !Spring IIJI.J2, at 19lthill this
provisiun simply
11r1ens the initlill
l'Ulllpnnent of the II~,{ Act Wiliting pc·
rind. that is, the urdinary ,l() .. day delily
that ensue~ upon nntilicatiun of the government. Under this approach. 363(hll2)
lms no effect un the secund cumpunent
uf the waiting period. namely. the delily
that ensues upon issuance uf il sel·mul
request.

S

Mr. Spear~' (lll\itiun •~ cun~istenl with
that of the Feder;~l Trade Commission.'
Indeed, in one CiJse in whid1 the iiUthors
were involved, the Cummissiun went su
li1r ••~ tu issue a sel·und request without
nntifyin!! the h;mkruptcy l'oun supervismg the eslatl' in lJUesliun. ·' The Dcpilrtmentuf Ju,til·e app••rently takes alliff\~r
enl pusillun. i.e., that Sel·tiou J6.,(h)l.'!l
mudilie~ the entire IISR Act w;1iting pc·
rind, with the re~ult lhilt unly the hankrupll"?' mun l'iiO extend the Wiliting pcriud. Sem111: hill 540. introduced l'arher

Robert 8. Greenbaum is Special
Coun.tel at SkaJden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher &: Flom ~, Wa.thingiOn,
D.C. Alan J. Meese is an associate
at the firm.

---

this yeilf, wuulrJ clarify the stalutl•'s
mcilning.
Accmding to Mr. Spcm·s, the hmgu;~ge
of Section 363(b)(2) dues nul resolve the
lllilller. 111aking it m.l'eSSilry tu resort In
utht·r methods of inlcrprclillion. Sud1 itn
inquiry. he asserts,cnmpcls a cnndusion
lhill Section J(,:\(b)(2) leaves the ~uvern
menl free tu delay an al·4uisitum viii issuillll·e nf il second request. We di!lagrel·.
The urdinary meaning of Sectmn
.l6.,1hJ(2) requires the cnndusiun thallhl'
!llallllc supplimls the mitiill Clllll(lllOent
of the lfSR Al'l waiting periud itS well
a!l the delily lhal l'nMie~ U(lllll is~Uilnce
of a semnd relJUest. Til delily iln al·quisilinn hy more thiln Ill days. the guvernmelll must pel ilion the bankruptcy court.

Section 363(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code alters the
practice under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act (HSR Act) when a party acquires
assets cf d oankrupt estate. James Spears, FTC General
Counsel, has argued that this provision simply shortens
the initial component of the HSR Act waiting period.
Mr.

Spl~ilrs ·

pusiliun nml lllill nf the
nel.·css;Jrily re~l un the il!l·
sumptinn tlmt the IISR At'll'lllllains two
distinct Wililing periods: nne l're;Jied hy
!luhsecllnn (h)( I), and unl' l'renled hy
subsections (e)( I ) ilnd I 2) .' Thus. the argument l'lllllinues, Section J63(h)(21
modilies only the former "wailing pc·
riml," le;Jvint! lhe "second wailing pt··
rillll" inl:ll'l. lJmler lhi~ ••ppru<~ch, il 'ecnnd IClJUesl prcvenls the cnnsUilllllillinn
of llll ill'lJUisiliun hcl':IU!Ic suhsel·tions
(el: I I anll (2) upemle to prl'Venl illl itl'·
lJUisilion upon issuilnl."l' of il senmd re('nnuui~sinn
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quest.~ This reading is inconsistent with

the language of the HSR Act and the
Commission's rules implementing it.
The text of the Act speaks of only
one waiting period. Section 7 A prohibits
ccnain acquisitions unless: ( I) both parties have filed the requisite notification
and (2) "the waiting period described in
subsection (b)(l) of this section has
expired." 15 U.S.C. 18a(a). Subsection (b)( I) provides that "the waiting
period required under subsection (a)"
shall last thiny days from notification ( 15
days in the case of a tender offer) unless
the period is extended "under subsection
(e)(2)or(gl(2)." I~ U.S.C. IKa(b)( I )(8).
The language of the statute reveals no
second waiting period. Instead, Subsection (b)( I) creates a single thiny day periOIIthat can be exteuded upon the issuance of a second request.
The Commission's own rules conlinn
this reading. 16C.F.R. § MOJ.20(c), entitled "Waiting Period Extended" provides
that. un issuam:e of a second request,
"the waiting period shitll remain in cficct, even though the waiting period
would have expired, (sec ~ KO.l HI( b)) if
no .-;uch rct1uest had been made."
We assume that Congrcslo undcrstund
the text to which it was referring as well
as the interpretive gloss placed on that
lcxt by the Commission.~ Thus, Congrcslo must have usl.'d the phraloe "requtred waiting period" in Section
)6)(b)(2) to encompass both the thinyday lime frame created by subsection
(b)( ll mul any r.xtension of that peri;ld
effected pursuant to sub~·el·tions (c)( I),
(e)(2), or (g)(2). It follc:ws, then, that
Section J6)(b)(2) both supplants the thirty-day interval created by IISR Act loUb·
section (b)( I) and divests the government of its ustml authurily tu extend I hal
period its l'llnlernplated by the same ~ub
sectiun.
The necessity uf this result becomes
even mure ctunpclling when nne considerlo the implil'<tlinns of the- Commission's
aprruach fur the opcr:ttinn of tht~ IISR
Act ihelf. Subsection (a) foreMalls any
m:quisitinn before "the waiting period
tlesl·ribct.l in subsection lbl( II of this sel··
linn has e:(pirc-tl." I~ ll.S.C ~ IXa(:t).
The Commission's appruad1. thill is.
re-ading a reference to "the waiting pcritld"to apply only tuthe thiny-d:ty inter-
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val explicitly mentioned in subsection
(b)( I) itself, and not to any extensions
of it, requires a conclusion that subsection (a) only prevents those acquisitions
that would take place before the initial
thiny-day interval expires. Because subsections (e)( I) and (e)(2) do not themselves prevent acquisitions, but only operate to extend the thiny day interval
of subsection (b)( I ), 7 the Commission's
approach would render a second request
powerless to prevent an acquisition.

The ordinary meaning of Section 363(b)(2) requires the
conclusion that the statute supplants the initial
component of the HSR Act waiting period as well as the
delay ~hat ensues upon issuance of a second request.
In light of the statute's ordinary meaning, Mr. Spears' other arguments arc unconvincing. Our reading is not un implicit repeal of subsections (e)(2) and
Cgl(2): rcpcul is quite explicit. Sectiun
J6)(hl(2) rders to subsection (b) of the
IISR Act. Subsection (b)( I), in tum, expressly incorpomtes subsectiuns (e)(2)
and (g)(:!). Thus,thc reference in Section
]6J(b)(2) to subsection (e)(2) and (g){1)
is no murc ur less explicit than the reference to these provisions contained in
subsection (a) uf the JISR Act itself.
Mr. Spears' assenion that our rending
cannut he correct because it woult.lthwan
the purpose of Section 7A is equally untenahle. Genentl purposes cannot override a statute's ordinary meaning. Statutes arc means, nul cnt.ls, and \•lngrcss
presumably dmoscs the means cognizant
of lhe increasing cm:ts 'lf pursuing certain goals more r.nd more vigorously.
Thus, "it frustrates rather limn cffel·tulltes legislative intent simplistically tu assume thatll'/wtc'l'c'r funhus the statute's
primary objective must be the law." Rodri~llc•; 1'. Unitc•tl Sllllc'.\", 4XO U.S. 522,
525-26 ( 1987).

Scl·tiun .l6)(b)(2) w;ts ohviuusly
crafletl with two ·:ompeting objectives in
mind: streamlining the premerger review
prucess for bankruptlinns while preserving the g,wernment's ability to review
proposed transactions. II is not likely tlutt
interpreting the Section in light of only
on.: uf these purposes will achieve Congress\ intent. The best evidence of how

s

A

R

T

c

L

E

s

Congress struck this balance is found in
the language of the statute itself.
When a firm enters bankruptcy, powerful considerations militate against ex·
ten•Jed premerger review. lmplementa·
lion of Section 363(b)(2)'s ordinary
meaning as we propose here strikes the
balance between competing interests in
two ways. First. it a<.cclerate!l the gov·
ernment's decision concerning the issuance of a second request. Second, it
wisely tra'lsfers discretion over the
length of any investigation from the government to the bankruptcy court. This
court is more likely to possess the ex peri·
ence necessary to appreciate fully the
exigencies of the situation. It also will
be in an excellent position to evaluate
the antitrust issue most likely to predomi·
nate, the application of the failing firm
defense. Such discretion would not be
"unbridled" as Mr. Spears claims; in·
stead, like the discretion exercised by
the government, it would he constmined
by the values that call forth the delega·
tion in the lirst instance.
In Mr. Spears' view, our rending
wuuld confer "broad, unchecked author·
ity" un the bankruptcy courts of the sun
nut ordinarily exercised by such tribunals. lie nssens that, because the author·
ity we envision docs not involve matters
thill arise "em/\• in the context of bank·
ruptcy pruccedings" (emphasis in original), it is nut authority uvcr a "cure"
proceeding that can be left to the bankruptcy court. We disagree.
As an initial matter, this
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proves too much. Our reading would vest
the bankruptcy court with the power over
both components of the waiting period
created by IISR Act subsection (b)( I).
Mr. Spears' reading would merely confer
authority over the first component. Nei·
ther matter is the sort that only arises in
bankruptcy, except, of course, lly virtue
of Section 363(b)(2) itself. Thus, under
Mr. Spears' approach,the Commission's
reading would itself be incorrect,thereby
suggesting that Mr. Spears' approach tu
defining "core" matters is off the mark.

mr.v issue that involves a federal law reg·
ulating interstate commerce. Ar. Mr.
Spears concedes, some courts have in·
steud held that Section 157(d) means
what it says, i.e .• mandates withdrawal
only when "btJtlr title II cmc/ other laws
of the United States regulating . . . inter·
~tatecmnmerce" arc involved. 2K U.S. C.
§ I57( d) (emphases added). • If these
courts arc correct, withdmwu~ of federal
disputes is not mandatory, and Congress
assumed that bankruptcy courts would
be passing on issues of federal law.~

Instead of asking whether the author·
i!y contemplated relates to those nmtters
that could only arise in bankruptcy, we
wuuld ask whether vesting the authority
111 issue in a bankruptcy judge would im·
plicate the son of constitutional conl·ems
that led Congress to draw the "core"/
"non-core" distinction. Northc•r11 PiJit'·
lim· CmiJirltc·timr Co. l'. Mcmllhmr !•ipc•
l.illt' Co .• 45K U.S. 50 ( ICJK2), held that
Congress could not vest non-Article Ill
courts with the pclWl~r to adjudicate traditiunal cununun law claims. Our appmlll'h would not confer on the hankruptl'Y cnun any function that Article Ill
requires to be handled by life-tenured
JUdges. Instead, it would transfer author·
ity from one non-article Ill dedsionlllilker. the exel·utive branch, tu another,
the bankruptcy court.

In addition. not all of the courts that
take a nontextual approuch Ill Section
157(d) require withdrawal 11'/r('IIC'I't'r a
federal statute regulating interstate cummerce is involved. lnsteud, many l'UUrt~
require withdrawal only where the proceeding requires the bankrupll'Y l'oun "to
engage in significant interpretutiun. as
oppc1sed to simple application, uf federal
laws upan frmn the bankruptcy
statutes.""'

Mr. Spears' argument based on the
withdrawal pruvision of 157(d) fares nu
better. This argument rests on a cuntro·
versial reading of 157(d) that would require withdrawal to the district court uf

Thus, even under thl' majnrity ap·
prn&tch In§ J57(dl. it is fur from clearthut
tlel'isions under uur reading uf Section
363{b)(2) wmrld be subject to mandatury
withdrawal. AI any rate. even if the interprct;•tinn of Section J57(d) utTered by
Mr. Spe;1rs is the l'Orrcct nne. all that
follows is that decisions whether to extend the Witiling period must be withdrawn tu the distrirt court. not that Section 363(b)(2) should be "interpreted" to
provide the govern nent with sole discre·
tion over the re\'ie\oo' of itcquisiticms uf
wasting assets. •
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'"Under \e(liun J6lof lhc: banknaplq cnde, II ll.S.C'. § .lfc.llhll21. huwevcr, lhc wailin~ pcrind fur a uan•a(liun hy a lnJ\Ice exp•n:• 10 ll;•y• allcr lilm~ uf IlK'
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Chll'at:u. 441 lJ.S. 677, !l'lf•·'IK 11'17111 hamel
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by ntlc
If> C. FR. § KII.Ufl(t·l
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